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New Problems with Removal and the ALI* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One version or another of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the federal removal 
jurisdiction statute, has existed since the Judiciary Act of 1789.1  The 
removal statute provides defendants with the opportunity to choose the 
forum they prefer, if there is a choice between a federal or state forum.  
The rationale is that the defendant did not choose to be sued, and because 
she did not initiate the suit, she had no choice in where the suit would be 
tried.2  Thus, the plaintiff potentially has an unfair advantage over the 
defendant, because the plaintiff will choose the forum that is either most 
advantageous to her or least advantageous to the defendant. 
The state court may be more advantageous to the parties than the 
federal court for a number of reasons.  For example, the presiding judge 
in the state court may be more inclined to find for plaintiffs, the absence 
of a jury may be relevant, or it may be the case that the state court is less 
crowded than the federal court.  And so, because of the possible 
advantages or disadvantages associated with state or federal court in a 
case where either court may have jurisdiction, it has long been held that 
if the defendant objects to the forum where the suit is brought, it is the 
defendant’s right to remove the case (at least to the federal court). 
The removal statute is divided into three subsections.  The first two 
subsections, § 1441(a) and (b), allow the defendant to remove the suit to 
federal court if the federal court would have had jurisdiction over the 
entire suit originally.3  Section 1441(c) allows the action to be removed 
in a suit where the claims are mixed, i.e., where there are some claims 
over which the state has jurisdiction, and different claims over which the 
federal court would have jurisdiction as well.  Neither § 1441(a) nor § 
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 1. Edward Hartnett, A New Trick from an Old and Abused Dog: Section 1441(c) Lives and 
Now Permits the Remand of Federal Question Cases, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1099, 1103–04 (1995). 
 2. Id. at 1105. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b) (2003). 
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1441(b) would allow removal in these circumstances because they 
require all claims to have original jurisdiction in the federal court.4 
Section 1441(c) reads as follows: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within 
the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one 
or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire 
case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues 
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law 
predominates.5 
There have been several persistent problems with § 1441(c).  First, it 
is not entirely clear what can and cannot be removed under § 1441(c).  
The courts are split with regard to removal by third-party, cross-claim, 
and counterclaim defendants.6  For example, the majority holds that 
third-party removal is unacceptable, but the minority position is that 
third-party removal is acceptable.7  Not allowing these defendants to 
remove may cause many unfair outcomes. 
Second, the statute as currently drafted allows federal question 
claims8 to be remanded to state court.  The section provides that “the 
district court . . . in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State 
law predominates.”9  Thus, the federal court may send the suit back to 
state court, even if there is a federal question, as long as the court decides 
that the “predominant” issue is not the federal question. 
Third, the statute as it stands today employs the “separate-and-
independent” test to determine whether a claim is removable to federal 
court.10  Many consider this test to be not only ambiguous but also 
superfluous because a similar test, the “relationship” test, is used by the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute to determine if a state claim may be 
                                                     
 4. § 1441(c). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Compare Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1991); Sterling Homes, 
Inc. v. Swope, 816 F. Supp. 319, 321 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Elkhart Co-op Equity Exch. v. Day, 716 F. 
Supp. 1384, 1388 (D. Kan. 1989); Share v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 550 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. 
Pa. 1982); and Lowe’s of Montgomery, Inc. v. Smith, 432 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (M.D. Ala. 1977) (all 
holding that third-party removal is not allowed); with Carl Heck Eng’rs v. LaFourche Parish Police 
Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1980); Soper v. Kahn, 568 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D. Md. 1983); 
Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D. Ala. 1980); and Ted Lokey Real Estate Co. v. 
Gentry, 336 F. Supp. 741, 743 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (all holding that third-party removal is acceptable). 
 7. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 8. A federal question claim requires the application of federal law to an issue presented in the 
cause of action.  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2003). 
 10. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9 (1951). 
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heard in federal court.11  Because the two tests are performing essentially 
the same function, it has been argued that the separate-and-independent 
test should be eliminated and replaced with the less ambiguous 
relationship test.12 
In 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist created the Federal Courts Study 
Committee, which recommended that Congress repeal § 1441 in part 
because the statute did not allow diversity jurisdiction.13  However, 
Congress refused to do so. In its most recent revision of the removal 
statute, it felt it was necessary to retain § 1441 to prevent a plaintiff from 
defeating removal by joining an unrelated state claim to a federal 
question case.14  The House Report noted that the joinder rules of many 
states allow a plaintiff to join a completely unrelated state claim.15  
Without § 1441(c), a plaintiff joining a state claim would defeat removal 
because of the requirement that the federal court have jurisdiction over 
every claim in the suit.  If an unrelated claim could in fact be joined, it 
would be particularly easy for a plaintiff to defeat removal.  She could, 
for example, attach a practically meritless negligence claim to a 
substantial patent infringement claim.  Without § 1441(c), the defendant 
would not be permitted to remove the case to federal court, although 
federal court would probably be where the case belonged. 
Finally, the American Law Institute (ALI) began its Federal Judicial 
Code Revision Project in 1994.16  It recently released its report of this 
project.  The project covers “three topics in which current statutes could 
be clearly demonstrated to be working sub-optimally: supplemental 
jurisdiction, removal, and venue.”17 
The ALI makes three findings regarding removal.  First, the ALI 
adopts the majority view and disallows removal by third-party, cross-
claim, and counterclaim defendants.18  In adopting this view, the ALI 
argues that the removable federal claim must be present in the initial 
                                                     
 11. AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 512 (2004). 
 12. Id. 
 13. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
94–95 (1990). 
 14. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1145. 
 15. H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 23 (1990). 
 16. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 1.  The ALI began this project in honor of its twenty-fifth 
anniversary.  In 1959, Chief Justice Earl Warren asked the ALI to engage in such a project, and it did 
so, resulting in “enormous influence on the thinking of the bench, the bar, and the academy.”  Id.  
But Congress was not persuaded to accept all of its recommendations.  In light of that, the ALI 
decided to try again.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 2. 
 18. Id. at 333. 
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pleadings.19  Thus, cross-claim, counterclaim, and third-party defendants 
cannot remove because it is likely that the federal claim upon which they 
base the power to remove was not included by the plaintiff in the first 
pleading. 
Second, the ALI’s revisions attempt to disallow federal questions 
from being remanded to state court.  The revisions eliminate the judicial 
power of discretion to remand claims to state court, and instead require 
that judges remand certain claims.20  The ALI would change the statute 
to preserve federal subject matter jurisdiction by requiring that all federal 
claims and state claims that are a part of the same case or controversy 
remain in federal court.21 
Third, the ALI would change the criterion used to determine whether 
an action is removable from “separate and independent”22 to a removable 
claim being one attached to a claim that is “not part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the Constitution.”23 
The ALI’s suggestions fall short of perfecting an imperfect statute.  
First, the decision not to allow third-party, cross-claim, or counterclaim 
defendants removal privileges is a mistake.  Second, the revision that 
disallows judges the discretion to remand federal question cases to state 
court in turn allows piecemeal litigation, which is less than desirable.  
However, the replacement of the separate and independent test with the 
relationship test is a good change because it collapses two tests into one.  
This change, if adopted, would probably result in less confusion among 
attorneys and courts because there would be one less test to master. 
This Comment will first examine the problems that currently exist 
with the last section of the federal removal statute.  Then, the Comment 
will examine the ALI’s suggestions for amending the statute to correct 
the current problems.  Finally, the Comment will offer both a critique of 
the ALI recommendations and suggestions for improving them. 
II. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF REMOVAL 
Beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, a case could be removed 
when all claims fell within federal jurisdiction.24  This allowed for state 
                                                     
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 374. 
 21. Id. at 372. 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2003). 
 23. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 333–34. 
 24. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1103. 
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joinder rules to block removal.25  (For example a state claim could be 
joined to the federal claim, thus preventing the case from being removed 
because not all claims fell within federal jurisdiction.)  To prevent the 
plaintiff from blocking removal by using state joinder rules, Congress 
revised the statute in 1866 to allow “piecemeal removal.”26  Piecemeal 
removal permits parts of a case to be removed to federal court, while 
other parts of the case remain in state court.  Because of the confusion it 
caused within the courts, piecemeal removal was soon abandoned.27  
Congress instead enacted a special removal statute to avoid the state 
joinder rules (this statute eventually evolved into § 1441(c)).28 
Although Congress had abandoned piecemeal removal in 1948, some 
courts continued to allow it.29  To stop the courts from using piecemeal 
removal, Congress enacted § 1441(c).30  Piecemeal removal was no 
longer necessary because § 1441(c) allowed for removal of the entire 
case if even a single separate removable claim existed therein.31  The 
statute allowed removal in instances of both diversity and federal 
question jurisdiction.32 
In 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist created the Federal Courts Study 
Committee to assess the state of federal jurisdictional laws.33  The 
committee recommended that § 1441(c) be abolished because of the 
confusion caused by removal of diversity jurisdiction cases.34  The 
committee asserted that removal jurisdiction helped in such a limited 
number of federal question cases that it was not necessary to retain the 
section.35 
In 1990, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act.36  It did 
not accept the recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee 
to abolish the statute; instead it revised the statute.  The revision of § 
1441(c) eliminated removal in circumstances where federal jurisdiction 
was conferred on the federal claim because of diversity jurisdiction 
(following the suggestions of the Federal Courts Study Committee). 
                                                     
 25. Id. at 1115. 
 26. Id. at 1117. 
 27. U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2003). 
 28. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1129. 
 29. Id. at 1130. 
 30. Id. at 1129. 
 31. Id. at 1130. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 13, at 3. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
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Congress felt it necessary to retain § 1441(c) because it was the only 
section of the removal statute that allowed a defendant to remove a case 
even if the plaintiff was attempting to block the removal through the use 
of state joinder rules.  The other sections of the statute require that every 
claim in the case fall under the original jurisdiction of the federal court.37  
Thus, a plaintiff could join a meritless state claim to her federal claim, 
and removal would become impossible for the defendant.  This problem 
is known as “fraudulent joinder.”  Section 1441(c) prevents fraudulent 
joinder because it allows actions that include both federal and state 
claims to be removed to federal court. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Removal by Third-Party, Cross-Claim, and Counterclaim 
Defendants 
The courts have adopted different views about whether third-party, 
cross-claim, and counterclaim defendants are able to remove actions to 
federal court under § 1441(c).38  Although prima facie the statute does 
not appear to prevent one of these defendants from removing, most 
courts have decided that congressional intent was to prevent them from 
doing so.39 
1. The Problem 
Counterclaim, cross-claim, and third-party issues have arisen in 
connection with § 1441(c).  For example, in Verschell v. Fireman’s Fund 
Insurance Co., the district court held that no defendant in any cross claim 
filed after the plaintiff’s complaint had been issued had a right of 
removal, unless the right of removal arose from the original plaintiff’s 
complaint.40  This result is problematic because it is potentially unfair to 
defendants either named in the original action or brought into the action 
by a named defendant.  Consider the following example: A sues B in 
state court, and A’s complaint includes no removable claim.  Then, B 
                                                     
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b) (2003). 
 38. See cases cited supra note 6. 
 39. See, e.g., Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir. 1991); Elkhart Coop. 
Equity Exch. v. Day, 716 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (D. Kan. 1989); Share v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 550 
F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Lowe’s of Montgomery, Inc. v. Smith, 432 F. Supp. 1008, 
1013 (M.D. Ala. 1977) (all holding that third-party removal is not allowed). 
 40. 257 F. Supp. 153, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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joins C as a defendant to the suit.  When B joins C as a defendant, B also 
brings a cross claim against C.  The cross claim that B brings involves a 
federal question.  Under the Verschell holding, C would not be able to 
remove the case to federal court because C is a defendant in a cross claim 
“thereafter filed” and thus has no right of removal.41 
The same problem may arise with counterclaims.  Consider the 
following example: A sues B in state court, and A’s complaint includes 
no removable claim.  Then, B states a counterclaim that contains a 
federal question in her pleadings against A.  If A wishes to remove the 
claim to federal court, on the rationale of the Verschell court, she would 
be unable to do so because the joinder of claims that allows removal to 
federal court by §1441(c) refers to the joinder of claims by the plaintiff.42  
Under Verschell, there is no reason to allow a party to remove a suit to 
federal court when the original pleadings contain no removable claim, 
whether the party interested in removing is an original plaintiff or an 
original defendant. 
In the example above, however, the plaintiff could attach a federal 
question claim to her complaint and remove to federal court.  This result 
is problematic because the plaintiff is being compelled to seek a new 
cause of action that likely has little merit because it is one that the 
plaintiff created just to try the case in federal court.  Today’s dockets are 
already crowded enough and the court should not encourage an increase 
in litigation because of  procedure. 
Are these results anticipated by § 1441(c)?  Are they the results that 
Congress intended?  It is unlikely that disallowing these parties from 
removing was Congress’s intention.  The rationale behind allowing a 
defendant to remove a case is that the defendant, who is not choosing to 
be sued, has no control over the forum in which the plaintiff brings the 
suit.43 
In the first example, C had no choice about being sued by either A or 
B.  Further, C had no control over the forum in which the suit was 
brought.  Thus, there is no difference between a defendant who has the 
option of removing to federal court because the plaintiff brought a 
federal question claim and the defendant who is not only brought into the 
suit by another defendant, but is further sued by that defendant in a cross 
claim.  C should have the right to remove the case to federal court. 
                                                     
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Haden P. Gerrish, Third-Party Removal Under Section 1441(c), 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
133, 141 (asserting that a third-party defendant, like an original defendant, may need the protection 
of the removal laws). 
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One could argue that removal would be unfair to the original 
plaintiff, though, because the plaintiff has a right to have her state claim 
case heard in state court, where the court has more authority to interpret 
and apply state laws.  But having her case removed to federal court is a 
risk the plaintiff must take.  It is not fair to prevent a defendant from 
removing to federal court on grounds that the plaintiff has a right to have 
her case heard in state court when the defendant has no choice about 
being sued.  The defendant should have some say in where the action is 
brought, if it is possible for the action to be brought in multiple fora. 
2. The Split Among the Courts 
The majority view among courts is that third-party defendants may 
not remove a case.44  Courts that do not allow third-party removal have 
made a two-pronged argument against it.45  First, courts “start with the 
federalist principle that removal statutes are to be strictly construed 
against removal because they serve to broaden the jurisdiction of federal 
courts at the expense of state courts.”46  The authority for this view 
comes from Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets.47  Shamrock requires 
that removal statutes be strictly construed against removal, giving “‘[d]ue 
regard for the rightful independence of state governments.’”48  The 
Supreme Court felt strongly that federal courts should not overstep their 
jurisdictional boundaries.49 
Then, these courts focus on the language of § 1441(c).  Courts that 
do not permit third-party removal argue that the statute clearly does not 
allow third-party removal for two reasons.50  First, § 1441(c) speaks to 
“joined” claims: a separate and independent claim must be joined with 
one or more otherwise nonremovable claims.51  Courts have interpreted 
                                                     
 44. E.g., Share, 550 F. Supp. at 1109; Lowe’s of Montgomery, Inc., 432 F. Supp. at 1013. 
 45. Starr v. Prairie Harbor Dev., 900 F. Supp. 230, 232 (E.D. Wis. 1995). 
 46. Id. 
 47. 313 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 48. Id. at 109 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)). 
 49. Id. at 108–09. 
 50. Some courts have also articulated a third reason for not permitting third-party removal. 
They argue that history demonstrates that third-party removal should not be allowed.  They argue 
that § 1441(c) was passed to restrict the right of removal.  See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 
341 U.S. 6, 9–10 (1951).  Further, the Judiciary Act of 1887–88 limited removal to defendants.  
Finally, the recent restriction against diversity jurisdiction as being appropriate grounds for removal 
indicates that Congress intends for the statute to apply to as few cases as possible.  See Sterling 
Homes, Inc. v. Swope, 816 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D. Pa. 1993) (articulating a similar argument to the 
one just advanced). 
 51. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000). 
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this language as being complaint oriented and governed by the rules of 
joinder.52  In other words, only a plaintiff may join claims in the original 
complaint.53  The courts argue that a “third-party complaint is not 
technically joined but is antagonistic to the original claims of the 
plaintiff.”54 
This argument is flawed. Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure governs joinder of claims.55  Rule 18(a) asserts that “a party 
asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim”56 may join as many claims as the party wishes.  The 
rule does not specify that only a plaintiff may join claims; as a matter of 
fact, the rule makes it exceedingly clear that any party in the action may 
join claims.57  Thus, § 1441(c)’s reference to joined claims does not 
clearly indicate that Congress intended for the statute to apply to only 
those claims joined by the plaintiff. 
State rules of civil procedure regarding joinder frequently mirror the 
federal rule.58  Consequently, it cannot be argued that the state rules, 
which are the rules that govern when the plaintiff brings the action, and 
the joinder rules, which govern the addition of parties to the action that 
join in the context of state rules, refer only to the plaintiff. 
Second, the majority of courts argue that because § 1441(a) of the 
removal statute states that any action in which the United States would 
have original jurisdiction “may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants,”59 § 1441(c) also requires that the action be removed by the 
original defendant.  If courts choose to adopt a very limited definition of 
“defendant”—such as, a defendant is only the original party being sued 
in a suit—that definition does not necessarily extend to §1441(c), which 
does not itself include the word defendant.  Section 1441(a) is not a 
preamble to the statute that indicates policy applicable to the entire 
statute, but a specific, independent section of the statute. 
For example, § 1441(c) limits mixed federal-state claims that may be 
removed to federal court to claims that are conferred federal jurisdiction 
because of federal questions (thus eliminating diversity jurisdiction as 
                                                     
 52. Swope, 816 F. Supp. at 322–24. 
 53. Id. at 323. 
 54. Id. 
 55. FED. R. CIV. P. 18. 
 56. Id. (emphasis added). 
 57. See also Gerrish, supra note 43, at 140 (arguing that this argument is flawed because 
joinder is not particular to plaintiffs). 
 58. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-218(a) (1994); ALA. R. CIV. P. 18(a); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 18(a); 
ME. R. CIV. P. 18(a) (all of these rules are identical to FED R. CIV. P. 18(a)). 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2003). 
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possible grounds for removal).  But this rule is not applicable under § 
1441(a), which makes no such limitation: a claim that is conferred 
federal jurisdiction because of diversity is removable.60  These courts 
recognize that the third-party defendant has no forum choice without 
removal, as in the case of original defendants.  But they think that 
preserving the state’s jurisdiction supersedes the interest of the third-
party defendant.61 
Although one may argue that the circumstances demand that the 
statute be read in pari materia, because the language of § 1441(c) is 
ambiguous, it still is not reasonable to assume that the word defendant 
means only the original defendant.  A statute may be read in pari materia 
if it is ambiguous.62  This rule of construction stipulates that statutes that 
relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed, and applied 
together so that the legislation’s intent can be gathered from the whole of 
the enactments.63  Even if the statute is read in pari materia, the word 
defendant in § 1441(a) does not necessarily connote the original 
defendant.  A party who has been brought into an action—for example, 
on an indemnity claim—is no less a defendant than the original 
defendant. 
The minority position allows third-party removal.64  Although these 
courts also begin with the Shamrock principle of narrow construction,65 
they disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the removal statute.  
These courts have adopted several strategies for third-party removal, 
which were described in Sterling Homes Inc. v. Swope.66  The court 
asserted that: (1) few courts allow removal of the entire case; (2) others 
allow third-party removal of the “severed part;” and (3) other courts 
permit third-party removal in theory, but have not yet had a case where 
they have decided that removal was appropriate.67 
                                                     
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004) (“[S]tatutes that are in pari materia may 
be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another 
statute on the same subject.”).  Also, I would like to thank my comment editor, Sarah Lepak, for 
suggesting that the statute be read this way. 
 63. See id. 
 64. E.g., Carl Heck Eng’rs, Inc. v. LaFourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 
1980); Soper v. Kahn, 568 F. Supp. 398, 405 (D. Md. 1983); Peturis v. Fendley, 496 F. Supp. 203, 
205 (S.D. Ala. 1980); Ted Lokey Real Estate Co. v. Gentry, 336 F. Supp. 741, 743 (N.D. Tex. 1972) 
(all holding that third-party removal is acceptable). 
 65. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 66. 816 F. Supp. 319, 321–22 (M.D. Pa. 1993). 
 67. Id. 
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For example, the Fifth Circuit permits third parties to remove cases 
to federal courts under § 1441(c), as long as the third party “allege[s] a 
separate and independent claim which was independently removable.”68  
That courts allow removal of the “severed part” seems irrelevant, though, 
because courts are given discretion by the statute to remand all matters in 
which the state law predominates.69  Accordingly, the court always has 
discretion to remand the rest of the case back to state court. 
The minority argues that the majority is wrong for the 
aforementioned reasons.70  If Congress intended for “join” to apply only 
to the plaintiff, then it easily could have said so.71  The minority argues 
that a narrow Shamrock construction of the statute72 does not entail 
adding language (e.g., the word “plaintiff”) to the statute.  These courts 
have adopted a more functional approach in determining who is a 
defendant, and they allow third-party defendants to qualify as defendants 
of the kind that Congress is addressing in § 1441(a)73 (although they 
could also choose to ignore this argument, as § 1441(c) does not include 
the word defendant anyway74).  These courts argue that the third-party 
defendant has no more choice of forum than the original defendant and 
so is afforded the same protection by the removal statute.75 
3. The Solution from the ALI’s Federal Judicial Code Revision Project 
The American Law Institute’s revisions to § 1441(c) do not appear to 
address this issue, although the revisions to § 1441(a) do address the 
issue.  Section 1441(a) of the removal statute is the provision that allows 
removal of “civil actions” where the federal court maintains original 
jurisdiction.76  Section 1441(a)(2) asserts that a case may be removed by 
the defendant if “every claim asserted in the complaint or other initial 
pleading is a removable claim.”77  Allowing only claims asserted in the 
initial pleading to be removed does not allow for third parties to remove 
                                                     
 68. BJB Co. v. Comp Air Leroi, 148 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
 69. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2003). 
 70. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 71. Sterling Homes, 816 F. Supp. at 323. 
 72. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 73. Sterling Homes, 816 F. Supp. at 324. 
 74. § 1441(c). 
 75. Sterling Homes, 816 F. Supp. at 324. 
 76. § 1441(a).  This statute allows removal based on jurisdiction acquired either by diversity or 
a federal question, unlike § 1441(c).  A further contrast between this section and § 1441(c) is that in 
§ 1441(c), a case may be removed based on an individual claim, whereas in § 1441(a) the whole case 
must fall under the federal court’s jurisdiction. 
 77. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 333 (emphasis added). 
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a claim to federal court, nor does it allow for claims in cross claims or 
counterclaims to be removed, because the claims in these cases would 
not be included in the initial pleading.  The reporter claims that this 
provision “makes clear what present law merely implies.”78  But, as is 
addressed above, it is unclear what present law implies, as can be seen by 
the split in the courts over whether third parties may remove.79  So it is 
unclear why the reporter treats the issue as if it is uncontroversial. 
Then, the revised version of § 1441(c) asserts that if a claim is 
removable based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (the statute granting federal 
question jurisdiction to the federal court), but attached to a nonremovable 
claim, it may be removed “as provided by subsection (a).”80  Thus, one is 
sent back to the provisions for removal set out by § 1441(a), including 
the provision that every claim asserted in the complaint or other initial 
pleading may be removed.  So third-party removal, or removal of a claim 
asserted in a cross claim or counterclaim, is also not allowed for under 
the ALI’s new subsection (c). 
When the ALI first considered this problem, it determined that third-
party removal was acceptable in diversity cases.81  But it worried that 
defendants would implead parties for the sole reason of removing the 
case to federal court.82  For example, a defendant may implead a 
manufacturer with corporate headquarters in a different state.  Then, the 
third-party defendant could remove the case to federal court.  To avoid 
this situation, the ALI would not allow parties to remove if the parties 
held certain relationships (e.g. employer/employee) or if they were 
insured by the same liability insurer.83  But now the ALI does not believe 
that third-party removal should be allowed even for diversity cases.84 
4. A Critique of the ALI’s Position 
The ALI and the majority made the wrong decision in not allowing 
third-party, counterclaim, and cross-claim removal.  The policy 
considerations that the majority believes should prevent third parties 
from removing do not outweigh the unfairness of the result to third-party, 
                                                     
 78. Id. at 351. 
 79. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 80. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 334. 
 81. See id. at 333 (permitting removal of diversity cases under § 1441(b)). 
 82. AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS § 1304(b), at 16–17, 144–46 (1969). 
 83. Id. 
 84. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 351–52. 
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cross-claim, or counterclaim defendants.  Although in the instances of 
cross-claim and third-party defendants there is a possibility that plaintiffs 
may be taken to federal court even when they have not introduced a 
federal jurisdiction claim into the suit, this risk is one that plaintiffs must 
bear for several reasons. 
First, it is unclear from the statute whether Congress intended to 
include cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party defendants.  Even if it is 
conceded that Congress meant for the term defendant from § 1441(a) to 
apply to § 1441(c) as well, it is far from clear that the “law implies” that 
cross-claim and third-party defendants do not qualify as defendants.  If 
cross-claim, counterclaim, and third-party defendants are not defendants, 
then what are they? 
If Congress had intended to exclude these parties from removing 
claims to federal court, then it could have said so in the statute, it could 
have provided a definition of defendant that excluded the aforementioned 
parties, or it could have easily modified the word defendant with the 
word “original.”  If the statute said that an action “may be removed by 
the original defendant” then it would be clear that Congress intended to 
exclude third-party, cross-claim, and counterclaim defendants.  But there 
is no reason to read a special definition of the word “defendant” into the 
statute.  And, because this is the only justification that the reporter 
provides for the ALI exclusion of these defendants,85 the change ought 
not to have been made. 
Furthermore, because no distinction should be made between the 
original defendant and defendants who later become parties to the suit, 
the later-joined defendants are owed the same rights as the original 
defendants.  It seems particularly unfair that a party would be denied the 
right to remove just because she was not first in line—either she was not 
an original party to the suit or the original pleadings did not include a 
federal claim.  If the third-party, cross-claim, or counterclaim defendant 
had been sued in a separate lawsuit, she would have the right to remove.  
But instead, she was unlucky enough to be included in a suit where she 
was not sued in the original pleadings or where a federal claim 
conferring jurisdiction was introduced later, and not in the original 
pleadings. 
There are two final policy problems to be considered with the 
position that third-party, cross-claim, and counterclaim defendants 
should be allowed to remove.  First, this position may force plaintiffs to 
contemplate every party that may be joined to a suit.  This may become 
                                                     
 85. Id. 
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expensive because of accruing legal fees, or it may even be impossible.  
If the plaintiff wants the suit to stay in state court and has not included 
any federal claims, then it is probably unfair to require the plaintiff to 
contemplate all of the parties that may be attached to the suit by the 
defendant. 
This worry leads to a second policy problem—fraudulent joinder of 
claims by the defendant.86  Consider the following example: A sues B and 
C in state court.  A does not include any federal claims in her complaint.  
B and C would prefer the action to be tried in federal court, because 
trying the action in federal court would probably result in case 
disposition decided by a judge, whereas it is more likely that a jury will 
decide the case in state court.87  But neither B nor C is able to remove the 
action to federal court because the federal court does not have 
jurisdiction.  So, B files a cross claim against C that includes a federal 
question, which confers federal jurisdiction to the claim. 
B introduces the claim only so C will remove the case to federal 
court; otherwise the claim has no merit.  On this view, C could then 
remove the case to federal court, where B and C believe the conditions 
would be more favorable to them, based on a claim introduced for the 
sole purpose of allowing removal.  This Comment’s position could even 
encourage B and C to collude with each other and agree that B should sue 
C so they can remove to federal court. 
However, this last result is unlikely.  First, the federal court 
maintains the discretion to remand all claims that are not federal back to 
state court.  This would probably leave the plaintiff in state court in most 
instances.  For instance, in the example, the federal court could leave 
only the federal claim between B and C in the federal court and send the 
other claims (A’s claims) back to the state court.  Second, sanctions can 
be brought against parties that introduce frivolous litigation, and bringing 
a claim just so the suit may be removed to federal court probably 
qualifies as frivolous.88  Even if the plaintiff could not argue for 
                                                     
 86. It is unclear if the term “fraudulent joinder” applies only to acts in which the plaintiff 
attaches to her pleadings a claim over which the federal court does not have jurisdiction, just to 
prevent the defendant from being able to remove.  If this is not the case, it certainly seems like the 
case described is the defendant’s version of fraudulent joinder. 
 87. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 424–25 (1992).  Miller’s empirical evidence 
in this article indicates that the most frequent reason that a defendant’s attorney wants to remove a 
case to federal court is so the case will be decided by a judge.  The most frequent reason a plaintiff’s 
attorney would prefer for a case to stay in state court is the attorney’s perception that it is more likely 
a jury will decide the case. 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 allows for sanctions to be brought against attorneys who introduce 
frivolous litigation. 
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sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because 
the plaintiff is not the victim of the frivolous lawsuit (the plaintiff is the 
victim, ultimately, but not in the manner intended by the rule, because 
the plaintiff is not being frivolously sued89), the court may bring Rule 11 
sanctions sua sponte.90 
In conclusion, the ALI should not prevent third-party, cross-claim, or 
counterclaim defendants from removing claims to federal court.  Instead, 
the amendments to the statute should reflect the current intent (as it can 
be inferred) of Congress to allow all defendants the right of removal. 
B. The Federal Courts’ Ability to Remand Federal Question Cases 
Back to State Courts 
1. Can Federal Questions be Remanded? 
The last section of § 1441(c) states that the district court “may 
determine all issues [of the suit—both federal and state claims] . . . or, in 
its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law 
predominates.”91  The language of this remand clause was changed by 
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 from the prior language of the 
statute, which stated that the district court had discretion to remand “all 
matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.”92 
This amendment appears to allow federal question claims to be 
remanded to state courts, as long as the federal question claim is not the 
dominant claim.  Soon after the amendment was adopted, several 
commentators noted that “matters” could be construed widely enough to 
allow remand of the entire case.93  This demonstrates that not only could 
                                                     
 89. Although, from a prima facie reading of the rule, there is no reason why the plaintiff could 
not make such a move.  The rule requires only that the party filing the motion for sanctions 
demonstrate that “the claims . . . are not warranted by existing law”.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).  There 
is no reason that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that this was the case, even though the claim in 
question pertained to parties other than the plaintiff. 
 90. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(B). 
 91. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2003). 
 92. Id.; Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 312, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114 
(1990). 
 93. E.g., Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1159; Thomas M. Mengler et al., Recent Federal Court 
Legislation Made Some Noteworthy Changes, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 31, 1990–Jan. 7, 1991, at 20–21; 
David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New Judicial 
Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 78 (1991).  It should also be noted that Siegel wrote the 
commentary that accompanies the annotated version of the Amendment.  David D. Siegel, 
Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions of Section 1441, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 1994).  In the 
commentary, he advances the same position that he advances in the aforementioned paper.  See id. 
(stating that a court may remand a whole case to state court if state law predominates). 
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single federal question claims be remanded to state court, but so could 
entire suits that may involve several federal question claims. 
2.  The View of the Courts 
Although commentators mostly advised against this construction,94 
initially federal district courts began to assert in dicta and holdings the 
power to remand entire federal question cases that had been removed 
from state courts.95  Later, numerous circuit courts wrote opinions that 
asserted that they in fact did not have the discretion to remand whole 
cases that included federal questions to state court.  Instead, these courts 
argued that the discretion to remand cases to state court was limited.  The 
reasoning in these cases tends to be thin.  For example, in Borough of 
West Mifflin v. Lancaster,96 the court first argues that the purpose of 
changing the language in the remand clause was that Congress was 
trying to avoid piecemeal litigation.97 
One could also argue, though, that the congressional intent in 
changing the language of the remand clause was to accommodate the 
other changes Congress made in the statute.  The other piece of the 
statute that Congress amended was to restrict the right of removal in § 
1441(c) to claims that fell under § 1331.  Previously, § 1441(c) allowed 
removal in any instance that the federal court had original jurisdiction.98  
After Congress decided to restrict the claims that could be removed, the 
original language, “in its discretion, remand all matters not otherwise 
within its original jurisdiction,”99 was no longer appropriate.  It was no 
longer appropriate because the federal court was no longer allowed to 
permit removal of all claims that fell within its original jurisdiction. 
The Lancaster court then argues that the “separate and independent” 
claim requirement of § 1441(c) restricts the discretionary power of the 
federal district court.100  The court asserts that § 1441(c) allows for 
removal or remand only when the federal question claims are separate 
and independent from state law claims.101  The Lancaster court relies on 
the following authority: “‘Even if it is assumed that § 1441(c) would 
                                                     
 94. Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1159. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 45 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 97. Id. at 785. 
 98. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1990). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Lancaster, 45 F.3d at 787. 
 101. Id. at 786. 
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authorize the remand of an entire case, including federal claims, plaintiff 
must establish that remand of this case would be appropriate under [§] 
1441(c).’”102  The court then argues that because only state law claims 
that are separate and independent may be remanded, there will be no 
circumstances in which it is allowable to remand a claim in which state 
law predominates because these claims are not separate and 
independent.103 
3. Critique of and Response to the Majority View 
The plain language of the statute does not posit the same view as the 
Lancaster court.  Instead, the statute requires for removal a separate and 
independent claim that has federal question jurisdiction joined to the 
cause of action.  On a plain language reading of the statute, the court’s 
discretion to remand is not contingent on the separate and independent 
requirement.  Contrary to the Lancaster court’s view, the discretion to 
remand is contingent on the predominant matter of the claim.  If it is 
predominately state law, then it is permissible to remand the claim to 
state court. 
Congress distinguished the separate and independent requirement 
clause from the remand clause.  If it intended for the separate and 
independent requirement to apply to the federal district court’s 
discretionary ability to remand, then it would have said “the federal 
court, in its discretion, may remand all state claims which are separate 
and independent from the federal claims.” 
Essentially, the Lancaster court and other circuit courts that have 
found remand of the entire case to be impermissible are interested in the 
preservation of removal jurisdiction as it historically has been applied 
and also are determined to preserve the federal court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The court in Hickerson v. City of New York104 argued that 
Congress was not attempting to revolutionize removal jurisdiction with 
the 1990 amendment to the statute: “Congress was aware, however, of 
the federal courts’ strong view of their obligations to exercise jurisdiction 
over federal claims properly before them, and it is extremely unlikely 
that Congress would have used such ambiguous language to accomplish 
so significant a change in federal jurisdiction.”105  The court also held 
                                                     
 102. Id. (quoting Kabealo v. Davis, 829 F. Supp. 923, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1993)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 932 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 105. Id. at 558. 
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that the “sparse legislative history”106 that accompanied the 1990 
amendments indicated that Congress was not trying to make a dramatic 
jurisdictional change. 
This view probably has merit.  If Congress was attempting to make a 
large change (not even necessarily a revolutionary one), one would 
expect the modifications and changes in the language of the statute to be 
accompanied by explanatory legislative history.  No extensive legislative 
history accompanies the 1990 congressional amendments to the 
statute.107  Because Congress did not explain why it intended to allow 
federal question claims to be remanded, and because the language is 
ambiguous (as the Hickerson court pointed out), the language should be 
changed in an amended version of the statute. 
Policy considerations weigh in favor of changing the language as 
well.  If a federal question claim is present and removal was appropriate, 
the defendant deserves to have that claim heard in federal court, where 
the court is more qualified to apply federal law.  It is inane that a 
defendant could file a motion to remove to federal court, the court would 
grant the motion—“yes, you are allowed to try this claim in federal 
court”—and then remand the entire case back to the state court—“but 
sorry, the whole case is going to be heard in state court.”  Besides being 
costly to the defendant, this result is also extremely inefficient.  In many 
cases, the right of removal for the defendant would be illusory, in fact, 
not a right at all. 
4. The ALI’s Proposed Solution 
The ALI suggests the following changes to correct the problem of 
the potential remand of federal question claims: “Upon such removal [of 
a federal question claim] the district court shall sever from the action all 
claims that are not part of the same case or controversy as the claim that 
is removable under section 1331, and shall remand the severed claims to 
the State court from which the action was removed.”108  The ALI is 
suggesting several changes.  The first change is that the federal district 
court would no longer have the discretionary power to remand claims 
back to the state court, instead it would have an obligation to do so. 
Second, the ALI is adopting the position that the Lancaster court 
argues the current statute maintains.  To remand claims they must not be 
                                                     
 106. Id. 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2003). 
 108. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 334; see also 1441(c). 
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part of the same case or controversy.109  The ALI’s suggested 
amendments make explicit the Lancaster view:110 a claim may be 
removed if within the case there exists a federal question claim that is 
attached to a nonremovable claim (a state jurisdiction claim) that is not 
part of the same case or controversy.  The same test applies to remand: a 
claim must111 be remanded that is not part of the same case or 
controversy as the removable claim.112 
The federal district court may not remand claims where there are 
both federal law and state law matters.  Rather, these claims must stay in 
federal court.  The ALI is preserving the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
federal court with this amendment to the statute.  As it currently stands, 
the subject matter jurisdiction could at least potentially be compromised 
in instances where the federal question was predominated by state law. 
Moreover, in every case there will be claims that are remanded.  
Because the federal claim must not be a part of the same case or 
controversy and because the federal district court is required to “sever 
from the action all claims that are not part of the same case or 
controversy”113 as the removable claim, in every case where removal is 
allowed some of the claims will return to the state court.  Specifically, 
those unrelated claims to which the removable claim was joined will be 
remanded. 
For example, on the ALI’s view, if a plaintiff was suing a defendant 
for negligence and attached to this claim an unrelated trademark 
infringement claim, the defendant could file a motion for removal, and 
the court upon granting removal for the trademark infringement claim 
would be compelled to remand the negligence claim back to court.  
However, if the trademark infringement claim was tied to a related 
contract claim, as a part of the same case or controversy, that state claim 
would have to stay in federal court.  Only the claims that are not part of 
the same case or controversy as the federal question claim are to be 
remanded. 
The ALI’s amended statute seems much better than the current 
version of § 1441(c).  Its suggestions correct the problem with federal 
subject matter jurisdiction preservation that the courts have attempted to 
                                                     
 109. The ALI changes the language of the statute from “separate and independent” to “same case 
or controversy” for reasons discussed later in this Comment. 
 110. See infra Part III.B.2 for a general discussion of the Lancaster view. 
 111. Here, though, the ALI has changed the “may” to a “must.”  In the statute as it now stands, 
the court may remand; if the proposed changes were adopted by Congress, the court would be 
required to remand federal question claims. 
 112. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 334. 
 113. Id. 
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correct.  But unlike the courts, which engage in elaborate, improbable 
readings of § 1441(c) to justify preservation of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction, Congress, if it adopts the ALI’s amended version of § 
1441(c), would not have to disguise its true position behind a veil of thin 
reasoning. 
5. Assessment of the ALI Proposal 
The only problem immediately visible with the proposed changes is 
that they command piecemeal litigation.  If a remand is granted, then the 
parties will necessarily be arguing their cases in two different courts.  
Congress seeks to avoid this result.114  But, if it is the case that the only 
way to preserve federal subject matter jurisdiction is by allowing 
piecemeal litigation in remand cases, then piecemeal litigation must be 
allowed. 
It is far from certain that Congress will feel the same way, however, 
as it has tried for many years to prevent piecemeal litigation from arising 
under § 1441(c).115  Presumably, the discretionary remand was given to 
judges in this instance to avoid piecemeal litigation.  Defendants might 
be deterred from removing cases involving a federal question to federal 
court because of the time and expense associated with fighting suits in 
two different courts.  Also, if defendants are deterred from removing 
cases involving a federal question to federal court then state courts will 
be hearing federal issues.  This would inadvertently compromise the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court. 
At least the ALI recommendations clearly state what claims are 
subject to piecemeal litigation.  What remains in federal court, and what 
is remanded to state court, is specified by the statute.  With the ALI’s 
suggested changes, there will be no instances where a removal is granted 
and then the whole case is remanded.  Neither will there be instances 
where a defendant deserves to have a claim decided by the federal court 
but is unable to do so because that particular jurisdiction’s precedent 
requires that a claim be remanded if state law predominates.  Finally, the 
courts will not be forced to engage in creative interpretation to produce 
the correct result. 
                                                     
 114. See discussion supra Part II. 
 115. See discussion supra Part II. 
MARTIN FINAL.DOC 5/2/2006  11:03:09 AM 
2006] NEW PROBLEMS WITH REMOVAL AND THE ALI 509 
C. The Change from “Separate and Independent” to “Not Part of the 
Same Case or Controversy” 
1. The “Separate-and-Independent” Test 
The statute now employs a “separate-and-independent” test, which 
states that for a claim to be removed, the federal claim must be separate 
and independent from the nonremovable claims to which it is joined.116  
The test to determine whether a claim is separate and independent comes 
from American Fire and Casualty Co. v. Finn.117  The Supreme Court 
maintained in Finn that “where there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for 
which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, 
there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under § 
1441(c).”118  Thus, if a plaintiff suffers a single injury that occurs as a 
result of events that are somehow connected, then there are no separate 
and independent claims in the suit and the defendant does not have the 
power to remove. 
The Finn Court argues that Congress, which changed the test from a 
removable claim being one that is part of a “separable controversy” to 
one that is separate and independent, was trying to limit the number of 
cases that could be removed.119  The separable controversy test would 
allow for removal if there were one cause of action120 but multiple 
parties. 
For example, assume A and B are in a car wreck.  They sue C, the 
driver, and D, the manufacturer of C’s car.  Their single injury could 
have been caused by multiple acts of negligence.  As the Court noted in 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs: “The mere multiplication of grounds of 
negligence alleged as causing the same injury does not result in 
multiplying the causes of action.”121  They could be suing C because C 
failed to use her brakes in a timely fashion, and D because the faulty 
brake pads contributed to C’s negligence.  The claim against C and the 
claim against D, although part of one cause of action, could be separate 
controversies. 
                                                     
 116. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, § 1441, at 333–34. 
 117. 341 U.S. 6 (1951). 
 118. Id. at 14. 
 119. Id. at 9–10. 
 120. The term “cause of action” has been notoriously difficult to define.  The Finn Court relies 
on the definition provided by the Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs: “A cause of 
action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show.”  383 
U.S. 715, 723 (1966) (citing Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927)). 
 121. Id. 
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To prevent C or D from removing, Congress changed this separable 
controversy test.  Under the new separate-and-independent test created 
by Congress, the Finn Court argues that neither C nor D would be able to 
remove their cases to federal court.122  And so the new test does not 
allow for removal where there is one cause of action and multiple parties.  
Instead, it demands that a removable claim or cause of action be one that 
is separate and independent—which on the Finn Court’s account means 
that the claim or cause of action must not arise from the same transaction 
or series of events.  C and D would be unable to remove because the 
injury suffered by A and B was caused by several negligent events and it 
was the combination of these events that led to A and B’s single injury. 
If, on the other hand, A and B were first hit by C, then drove off and 
were later hit by E, and suffered injuries that could be directly 
attributable to the respective wrecks, it would probably be possible for C 
and E to remove.  A and B suffered two harms, and the events were not 
necessarily related. 
2. The ALI’s Recommendation and the Relationship Test 
The ALI feels that the separate-and-independent test is murky and 
introduces unnecessary ambiguity into the statute.123  It finds the 
separate-and-independent test to be “historically uncertain.”124  The 
commentary does not indicate why the ALI feels the statute is 
historically uncertain.  Presumably, the uncertainty lies in the application 
of the test to complicated sets of facts, uncertainty about the definitions 
of “cause of action” and “claim,” and uncertainty about the congressional 
intent in enacting the separate-and-independent test. 
To eliminate the historical uncertainty associated with a removable 
claim being one that is “separate and independent,” the ALI changes the 
language to the following: if a claim is not removable solely because a 
nonremovable claim has been joined to it that is “not part of the same 
case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution,” then the action 
may be removed.125  This language mirrors the language in 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(a).126  Section 1367(a) asserts that the district courts have 
                                                     
 122. In this example, there is no federal question, so the federal court would not have 
jurisdiction, but please ignore this.  Instead, focus on the separate-and-independent test, which this 
example illustrates. 
 123. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 372. 
 124. Id. at 372. 
 125. Id. 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2003). 
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supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part 
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.”127 
This language is referred to as the “relationship test.”128  In 1990, 
Congress sought to codify the results from several pendent and ancillary 
jurisdiction cases, including Gibbs, from which the relationship test 
comes.129  When Congress codified the doctrines in the cases, it gave 
them the collective name “supplemental jurisdiction.”130  Gibbs defines 
the relationship test as having two parts.131  First, supplemental 
jurisdiction exists when there is a claim “arising under [the] Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority.”132  Second, “the relationship between that 
claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action 
before the court comprises but one constitutional ‘case.’”133  To comprise 
one case the state and federal claims must derive from “a common 
nucleus of operative fact.”134 
The ALI’s proposed § 1441(c) would use the same test.135  For a 
claim to be removable, it must be joined to a nonremovable claim that is 
not part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 
Constitution.  Thus, the nonremovable claim itself must first be one that 
is not part of the same case or controversy.  As directed then by Gibbs, 
the claim must not derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.136  
Second, the nonremovable claim must not arise under Article III of the 
Constitution.  Thus, the claim must be a state claim. 
3. Assessment of the ALI’s Position 
The suggested language is modestly redundant.  Obviously the 
nonremovable claim must be a state claim, otherwise the whole case 
could be tried in federal court.  If there were not a nonremovable claim 
                                                     
 127. Id. 
 128. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 372. 
 129. JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & JOHN E. SEXTON, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 298 (8th ed. 2004). 
 130. Id. 
 131. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1986). 
 132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 133. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. 
 134. Id. 
 135. AM. LAW INST., supra note 11, at 372. 
 136. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. 
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present, then the case would be controlled by § 1441(a), which allows the 
removal to federal court those cases that fall entirely under federal 
jurisdiction.  So, the inclusion of the “under Article III of the 
Constitution” language is probably unnecessary.  However, because the 
ALI wants to indicate that the same test used for supplemental 
jurisdiction applies to removal jurisdiction in § 1441(c), perhaps reciting 
the exact same language is necessary to make this fact clear. 
It is better to make the language in § 1441(c) parallel the language in 
§ 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute.  With both the separate and 
independent test and the relationship test, the statutes are indicating that 
the same result is necessary to either hear the state claim in federal court 
(for supplemental jurisdiction) or to allow a federal claim to be removed 
to federal court instead of being heard in state court.  In both instances, it 
is necessary to decide whether (at least) two claims are related in such a 
way that it would be inconvenient or difficult to separate them. 
For example, if two claims share a substantially similar set of facts, it 
is not possible for them to be tried in two different courts—because the 
separate courts could decide the facts differently.  So, to remove a claim, 
or to keep a claim for supplemental jurisdiction, the relationship between 
the claims must be inspected.  Thus, there is no reason to provide two 
different tests by which to judge the relatedness of a state and federal 
claim.  Ockham’s razor tells us it is much more sensible to provide one 
test for both statutes. 
Further, the ALI’s suggestion to change the separate-and-
independent test to the relationship test in the removal statute should 
appeal to Congress.  The suggested change does not allow more cases to 
be removed to federal court.  This is appealing to Congress because it has 
indicated that it wishes to restrict the power to remove.137  Instead, the 
recommendation of the ALI simply clarifies a statute that was not as 
clear as it could be.  If Congress adopts the ALI’s recommendations, 
courts and attorneys should be pleased as well, because now a single test 
exists to determine whether multiple claims are so related that they may 
be heard in the same court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no question that § 1441(c) is in desperate need of revision.  
The suggested amendments by the ALI seem to solve most of the 
problems that arise with the current statute.  If its revisions were enacted, 
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many of the standing problems with the statute would disappear, and the 
ambiguity that exists in the statute now would be greatly diminished. 
The most problematic suggestion made by the ALI is that the court’s 
discretionary power to remand cases be abolished.  It is advocating a 
revision that does not merely encourage but demands piecemeal 
litigation.  Congress has revised the statute many times both to avoid 
piecemeal litigation and to let courts and practitioners know that 
piecemeal litigation is at best a last resort with regard to removal 
jurisdiction.  As it stands now, piecemeal litigation is mostly an 
unnecessary response to a removal under § 1441(c).  Because the court 
has the discretion to either keep all claims in the case or to remand some 
of the claims (currently, as discussed, it even appears that the courts can 
send federal questions back to the state court), then circumstances 
demanding piecemeal litigation will rarely arise. 
The ALI’s proposed changes will require piecemeal litigation 
because the judge no longer has the discretion to decide whether to keep 
the case.  Instead, she must remand to state court all claims not a part of 
the same case or controversy as the federal claim.  Because the ALI’s 
suggested revision of § 1441(c) requires that in order to remove, it is 
necessary for a state claim to not be a part of the same case or 
controversy, then the court in every case will have to remand that state 
claim back to the state court.  Thus, piecemeal litigation will occur every 
time removal is granted.  Surely Congress will be disinclined to find this 
suggested change acceptable. 
Perhaps the ALI could have suggested a more conservative change 
that corrected the “in which State law is predominate” problem.  Surely 
the ALI could preserve the right of federal courts to hear cases where 
they have subject matter jurisdiction without disallowing judges the 
discretionary power to keep or remand state claims. 
Further, the ALI’s disregard for the controversy surrounding the 
ability of third-party, cross-claim, and counterclaim defendants to 
remove also seems unhelpful.  Although it adopts the position that many 
courts have adopted, it ignores the fact that many other courts have 
decided these cases differently.  Among federal district courts, there is no 
uniform application of the law to this special class of defendants.  
Perhaps the ALI should have addressed this or tried to come to a better 
compromise position.  It is unclear what right of removal Congress 
thinks third-party, cross-claim, and counterclaim defendants have or 
ought to have.  In the proceeds from the Federal Judicial Code Revision 
Project, it should at least be noted that the courts are split as to whether 
these defendants have the right to remove. 
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The proposal for changing the separate-and-independent test to the 
relationship test used in the supplemental jurisdiction statute is good.  
Although the separate-and-independent test presents no insurmountable 
problems, the suggestion is good because it reduces the number of tests 
that the court is compelled to apply to reach the same result.  This change 
can only result in consistency among decisions in similar but different 
areas of the law. 
Congress would be wise to adopt most of the ALI’s suggestions 
regarding § 1441(c).  However, it is unlikely that Congress will adopt the 
suggestion that destroys the court’s discretionary power to remand, and it 
is not clear that it should.  Although the changes suggested by the ALI do 
not make the statute perfect, they certainly clear up many of the 
problems that have arisen as a result of the current statutory language. 
